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Abstract—For the past few years, 5G heterogeneous networks
(HetNets) have gain phenomenal attention in the wireless indus-
try. In this paper, we propose a hierarchical game theoretical
framework for the optimal resource allocation on the uplink of
a heterogeneous network with femtocells overlaid on the edge of
a macrocell. In the first game, the femtocell access points (FAPs)
play a non-cooperative game to choose their access policy between
open and closed in order to maximize the rate of their home
subscribers. The second game of the algorithm allows macrocell
user equipments (MUEs) to decide their connectivity between
the FAPs and the macrocell base station (MBS) with the goal
of maximizing their rates and the overall network performance;
thereby, distributing intelligence and control to the users. The
FAPs and the MUEs are the players of two different games
that strategically decide their policies in an ordered fashion.
Simulation results show that this hierarchical game approach
with network-assisted user-centric design offers a significant
improvement in terms of the performance of HetNets relative
to an closed and only network-centric access policy schemes.
Index Terms—Heterogeneous network, game theory, Nash
equilibrium, femtocell, user-centric, sum-rate.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the drastic increase in wireless data traffic, the de-
mand for higher data rates has become a key necessity for
the next generation mobile network. Heterogeneous networks
(HetNets), consisting of macrocells, picocells and femtocells,
have gained much momentum as a solution to this problem
in fifth generation (5G). While improving overall network
performance, it faces many challenges including network
modeling, radio resource management and energy efficiency
and several existing works have addressed these challenges
[1].
The deployment of femtocells helps in increasing the sum-
rate of the network but makes interference and centralized
control a challenging issue [2]. A considerable amount of
literature is available to address this concern of interference as
seen in [3] and the references therein. To reduce monitoring
complexity associated with centralized control for decision
making, user-centric schemes have drawn major attention. In
a user-centric scheme, user is on top of all that makes deci-
sion with or without network-assistance. User-centric scheme
focuses on the interest of the users and requires less computa-
tional complexity whereas network-centric scheme can make
more informed decisions at the cost of monitoring overhead.
Thus, a fusion of the aforementioned schemes can generate
interesting results [4].
The femto access points (FAPs) can operate in different
modes: closed, open and hybrid [5]. In closed access scheme,
resource sharing is not allowed and FAPs dedicate all of their
resources to their home subscribers. Whereas in open access
scheme, FAPs share their resources with the macrocell users
in order to avoid interference and to enhance the network
performance. The hybrid access policy puts a limit on the
resource allocation to macrocell users [6]. The selection of
access policy on the uplink is a tradeoff between interference
avoidance and saving resources and has a significant impact on
the performance of the network. Several existing works used
the game theoretical models to optimize the performance of
femtocells in the HetNets [7].
In this paper, we present a hierarchical game theoretical
framework consisting of two sub-games for resource allocation
to optimize the sum-rate of a heterogeneous network. This
scheme starts by modeling the FAPs preferred access policies
to optimize the performance of their registered users in the first
game, given the state of the network. The main focus of this
part is to analyze the conflicting interests of the FAPs in the
selection of their optimized access policies. The second game
uses user-centric approach by allowing the macrocell users to
finalize their association in order to maximize their interest
while keeping in view the network performance. To solve
this hierarchical game framework, we devise a distributed
scheme which always reaches a pure strategy Nash equilibrium
(PSNE). The coalition of two games optimises the data rates
for macrocell users and femtocell users, at the expense of
increased complexity of the game problem. Simulations have
shown that this proposed scheme outperforms the network-
centric scheme by a huge margin.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section
II, we present the system model of the proposed hierarchical
game framework. In Section III, we discuss the proposed
algorithm for network-assisted user-centric resource allocation.
Section VI shows the simulation results and Section V con-
cludes the paper along with the future work.
2II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider the uplink of a single cell heterogeneous network
having M femtocell access points (FAPs) overlaid on a
macrocell, as shown fig. in 1, having N macrocell user
equipments (MUEs). Let M = {1, 2, . . . ,M} be the set of
FAPs and N = {1, 2, . . . ., N} be the set of macrocell users.
We assume that a single femtocell user equipment (FUE) is
connected to each FAP. The system bandwidth, B, is divided
among FAPs in such a way that each FAP has K subcarriers
available, where K = B/M . This implies that the FUEs do
not create interference on the uplink to other FAPs as different
FAPs are allocated orthogonal bands using OFDMA. This can
be done using other methods as explained in [8]. The same
bandwidth, B, is also used by the macro base station (MBS),
where each MUE gets L subcarriers (L = B/N), which
introduces cross-tier interference between the femtocells and
the macrocell.
In this paper, we assume a Rayleigh fading channel with
path loss. The channel between the mth FAP and nth MUE on
kth subcarrier is denoted by hnm[k], whereas the distance be-
tween them is denoted by dnm. Similarly, the channel between
the FUE and its corresponding FAP on the kth subcarrier
be h0m[k] and the distance between them is symbolized by
d0m. Assume the channel between n
th MUE and MBS on
lth subcarrier to be hnb[l] and the distance between them be
dnb. The channel between the FUE of m
th FAP and MBS is
denoted by hmb[l] separated by the distance dmb. The transmit
power of nth MUE is signified by Pn and transmit power of
each FUE by P0. A Gaussian noise with zero mean and σ
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variance is added to all subcarriers at all FAPs and MBS.
The signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) for the



















where µm[k] = (h0m[k])
2P0W (d0m)
−β is the received
power from FUE at mth FAP on kth subcarrier and µmn [k] =
(hnm[k])
2Pn(dnm)
−α is the received power from nth MUE
Fig. 1. A heterogeneous network with femtocells overlaid on a macrocell.
at mth FAP on the kth subcarrier. The value W < 1 is the
wall penetration loss, α and β are the path loss exponents.
Let ρmn [k] ǫ {0, 1} signifies the connection of n
th MUE
to mth FAP on the kth subcarrier. The connectivity between
nth MUE and mth FAP on the kth subcarrier occurs when
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where µbn[l] = (hnb[l])
2Pn(dnb)
−α is the received power
at MBS from nth MUEs on lth subcarrier and µbm[l] =
(hmb[l])
2P0(dmb)
−α is the received power at MBS from FUE
of mth FAP on lth subcarrier.
In our proposed approach, a hierarchical game consisting
of two non-cooperative games is being played in a sequential
order. In the first game, each FAP decides among open, closed
and hybrid policy. Open access policy allows MUEs to connect
to FAPs to reduce interference at the expense of resources.
The closed access saves resources at the price of interference,
whereas the hybrid policy is the trade off between interference
and the cost of resources. This decision of FAPs depends on
the interference from the MUEs and also on the choice of
other FAPs, e.g., multiple FAPs cannot serve the same user
as it would end up in resource wastage. Thus, the FAPs form
a non-cooperative game with the goal of maximizing the rate
of their FUEs by deciding its access policies. The strategy
vector of FAP is the fraction of frequency band allocated to
each MUE and utility function is the rate of its FUE, which









where ρm = [ρ1,m[1], .., ρN,m[1], ρ1,m[2], .., ρN,m[K]]
T








T shows the strategy vector
of other FAPs and [.]T denotes the transpose operator.
In the other game, the MUEs re-evaluate their connec-
tivity obtained from previous game, forming another non-
cooperative game with the goal of maximizing their rates with-
out affecting the overall network performance. The strategy
vectors of the MUEs are the fraction of band allocated to
them by FAPs and MBS and the utilities are their rates. The

















where ρn = [ρ1,n[1], .., ρM,n[1], ρ1,n[2], .., ρM,n[2], .., ρM,n[K],
3ρb,n[1], ..., ρb,n[L]]










T includes the strategy
vectors of other MUEs.
The rate obtained by the MUE should not be less than a
minimum acceptable rate, Rmin, which is fixed for all MUEs
in the network. In case of connectivity between mth FAP and







































Now the strategy space for mth FAP in the first phase is
given as





ρmn [k] ≤ 1}. (8)
The above constraint makes sure that not more than one MUE
can be connected to mth FAP on kth subcarrier. For given
strategy vectors of other FAPs, we can define the optimization




Strategy space of nth MUE for the second game is
χ˜n = {ρn[l] ∈ (0, 1)
(M+1)L
: (ρmn [l] + ρ
b
n[l]) ≤ 1}. (10)
This constraint ensures that the MUE cannot be connected





We have solved the above games using Nash equilibrium. Nash









−i); ∀xi ∈ χ˜i, (12)
where xi represents the strategy vector of i
th player with the
utility function fi.
III. PROPOSED USER CENTRIC RESOURCE ALLOCATION
SCHEME: A HIERARCHICAL GAME APPROACH
We propose a distributed solution, which aims at maxi-
mizing the rate given to the users by optimizing the trade
off between interference and the resources. The algorithm
always reaches a pure strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE) while
achieving stable action profiles. It starts by allowing FAPs to
select their strategies while knowing the strategies of other
FAPs at any point in time, which is done using a parallel
Algorithm 1 Game Theoretic Network-Assisted User-Centric
Scheme for Resource Allocation
Find λ0 as described in section III.
REPEAT
for m = 1 to M do
Find N im, given ρ−m from (i− 1).
Allocate sub-band ∀ n ∈ N im.






n,i[k] > 1 then
Set ρn,m[k] = ρ∗m,n[k] for which µ
m
n [k] is max.
Set ρn,−m[k] = 0.
end if
Repeat till PSNE is achieved.
END
Find data rates for FUEs at FAPs.
Find data rates for MUEs at open FAPs and MBS.




∪ ... ∪N i
M
c1 = Sum-rate when the nth MUE is connected to the MBS.
c2 = Sum-rate when the nth MUE is connected to the mth FAP.
REPEAT
for n = 1 to N∗ do
if (Rate from MBS>Rate from mthFAP) then
if (c1 > c2) && (Rate from MBS> Rmin) then
Set ρb,n[l] = ρ
∗
b,n
[l] & ρm,n[l] = 0.
else
Set ρm,n[l] = ρ∗m,n[l] & ρb,n[l] = 0.
end if
else
Set ρm,n[l] = ρ∗m,n[l] & ρb,n[l] = 0.
end if
end for
Repeat till PSNE is achieved.
END
for n = 1 to N∗′ do
if (Rate from MBS< Rmin) then
Set ρb,n[l] = 0.
end if
end for
update technique. Using the information of other FAPs from
the (i − 1)th iteration, each FAP selects its own strategy at
the ith iteration. The first step is to form an initial strategy
vector λ0, without seeking equilibrium. In this vector, optimal








After that, each FAP explores the favorable set of MUEs
(N im) in each iteration, given the strategies of other FAPs from
(i−1)th iteration. The selection of N im (N
i
m can be empty) is
done in order to maximize the rates of FUEs (utility function of
the FAPs). In case of open access, each FAP needs to optimize
the selection of N im by checking the utility from servicing
a certain set of MUEs. To avoid complexity, the FAP could
find optimal set of MUEs with the help of greedy algorithm
as used in [9] rather than testing all possible combinations
of MUEs. Greedy algorithm helps FAPs by finding highly
interfering MUEs. Each iteration ends with the assurance that
multiple FAPs are not allocating resources to a single MUE
as it would result in the waste of resources. The connectivity
between FAPs and MUEs ensures the best interest of the users
of FAPs. These iterations continues until convergence, which
can also be achieved using other schemes, such as in [10].
After maximizing the rates of FUEs, MUEs play the next
game to maximize their rates using user-centric approach.
4MUEs which are connected to FAPs, as a result of previous
game, examine the rates they are getting from FAP and MBS.
MUEs stay connected to FAPs if the utility is greater for that
case. If the rate that the MUE is getting from the MBS is
greater, then the sum-rate is calculated for both cases with
MUE connected to MBS and with FAP. Each MUE opts for
the case where system is not affected and it gets the rate greater
than a defined threshold of Rmin. If the constraint of Rmin is
not met, the particular MUE goes into outage. At the end of
this game, each MUE ensures that it is not connected to FAP
and MBS simultaneously, thus saving resources. The above
steps are continued until all MUEs, which were previously
connected to FAPs, finalize their strategies in the best interest
of the network and themselves.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we present the numerical results of our pro-
posed algorithm with respect to various network parameters.
We consider a cell of 1000m radius where the FAPs and the
MUEs are uniformly scattered over the area. The FUEs and
the MUEs are assured to have same transmit power of 0.2
W. The path loss exponent α = 2, β = 2.5 and the wall
penetration loss W = 0.5 is assigned. The distance between
each FAP and its corresponding FUE is 1m. It is assumed for
simplicity that each FAP has one FUE. The noise variance is
set to σ2 = 10−14. The system bandwidth, B = 10MHz and
the minimum acceptable date rate for the MUEs is 500kbps
unless rated otherwise.
The improvement in the sum-rate for the proposed approach
relative to all closed and network-centric scheme for N = 7 is
shown in Table I . It can thus be concluded that our proposed
scheme outperforms both schemes by a significant margin.
This distributed algorithm ensures the welfare of all the users
by optimizing their utility functions.
We have compared our proposed scheme with two other
schemes. The first comparison of our proposed scheme is done
with an all-closed access policy scheme, where all the FAPs
have adopted a closed access that results in connecting all the
MUEs to the MBS. On the other hand, the second comparison
is with the network-centric optimized scheme. This scheme
allows FAPs and MBS to decide the connectivity of their
users. Hence the central entity reserves all the control. In
our proposed scheme, we have merged the network-centric
approach with the user-centric approach by spreading the
control and intelligence in the network rather than keeping
it to the central entity. This user-centric scheme not only
overtakes the network-centric scheme in terms of performance
but also offloads the complex computation from MBS and
distributes it to the network, thus requiring less computational
and monitoring complexity.
Fig. 2 shows a comparison of the achieved sum-rate of
the proposed scheme with closed access scheme and network-
centric optimized scheme. We can see that as M increases, the
sum-rate increases for the proposed scheme. This is because
the likelihood of the FAPs playing open access increases with
an increase in the number of FAPs, which in return service
the interfering MUEs; thus improving the performance of the
TABLE I




















Fig. 2. Sum-rate of an all closed scheme, optimized network-centric scheme
and proposed optimised user centric scheme with varying number of FAPs
and N=7 .
system and decreasing the outage probability. The same trend
of sum-rate is followed in the network-centric scheme but user-
centric scheme yields a significant improvement in terms of
utilities. In the case of all closed access scheme, the sum-
rate almost remains constant, although the number of FAPs
increases. This is due to the fact that as the density of FAPs
increases in the network, the MUEs appear closer to them
resulting in increased interference. This, in turn, decreases the
data rates of the FUEs and also forces the MUEs to go in as
seen in Fig. 3. The outage probability trend is same for both
user-centric and network-centric schemes as demonstrated in
Fig. 3, however, the proposed approach performs better in
terms of achieved data rate. Thus, we can say that our scheme
is as fair as network-centric though more capacity oriented.
Fig. 4 shows the comparison of sum-rate for an all
closed scheme, optimized network-centric scheme and pro-
posed scheme against different minimum rate requirements.the
percentage of users in outage for the proposed scheme and
the network-centric scheme is same although the sum-rate for
proposed scheme is better as described earlier. This difference
in sum-rate decreases as the minimum required rate increases
because the condition of Rmin is not satisfied and MUEs do
not participate in the optimization of sum-rate. However, for
increased number of users, this difference will again prevail.
5Fig. 3. Outage probability of an all closed scheme, optimized network-centric
scheme and proposed scheme for varying number of FAPs with N=7.
Fig. 4. Sum-rate of an all closed scheme, optimized network-centric scheme
and proposed scheme vs the minimum rate requirement for N=12 and M=10
with outage (shown in % at the top of each bar).
Fig. 5. Number of FAPs playing open access versus the varying number of
FAPs.
In case of all closed scheme, the sum-rate remains constant
while the outage percentage increases. This trends shows that
for small value of minimum required rate e.g. 250kbps, lesser
users are in outage while for high value of rate requirement,
e.g., 1Mbps, more users are in outage, however, each serviced
user is getting four times the data rate than the previous case.
Hence the overall rate attained remains the same.
In Fig. 5, the number of FAPs playing open access policy
are shown for our proposed approach. We can see that as
M increases, the number of open FAPs starts increasing to
service the MUEs till it reaches a saturation point. This trend
shows that as the number of FAPs start getting larger than
the MUEs, additional FAPs should not play open to save their
resources. We can observe that the number of FAPs playing
open increases when M ≤ 6 for a total of N = 7. However,
for N = 10 this increasing trend continues for M ≤ 8 and
this number increases for M ≤ 3 in case of N = 4.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
A hierarchical game-theoretic framework for resource al-
location is proposed in this paper, which allows the FAPs
to strategically decide between the conflicting access modes
while optimizing their allocated resources. It also enables
the MUEs to decide their connectivity while acquiring their
stable action profiles. The main focus of the players is to
optimize the tradeoff between reducing interference and the
cost of allocated resources. This hierarchical game frame-
work optimizes the data rates of the FUEs and the MUEs
while achieving the Nash equilibrium. We have applied low
complexity user-centric distributed approach to improve the
performance of the network and the simulation results have
proved that the proposed algorithm significantly outperforms
the network-centric scheme. In future, we will investigate
the optimal power allocation for network entities which may
further improve the performance of the proposed scheme.
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